Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation

@article{Cho2014ThreepartyCI,
  title={Three-party competition in parliamentary democracy with proportional representation},
  author={Seok-ju Cho},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={2014},
  volume={161},
  pages={407-426}
}
  • Seok-ju Cho
  • Published 2 March 2014
  • Economics, Political Science
  • Public Choice
This article studies the long-run dynamics of policy choices, government formations, and voting behavior under a parliamentary constitution and proportional representation. I develop an infinite period game where, in each period, voters participate in a proportional representation election, and three farsighted parties bargain over one-dimensional policy programs and government positions. The model incorporates the interaction between elections and coalition bargaining, which is the essence of… 
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