Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind

  title={Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind},
  author={Mark Phelan and Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols},
  journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine… 
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