Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind
@article{Phelan2013ThinkingTA, title={Thinking things and feeling things: on an alleged discontinuity in folk metaphysics of mind}, author={Mark Phelan and Adam Arico and Shaun Nichols}, journal={Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year={2013}, volume={12}, pages={703-725} }
According to the discontinuity view, people recognize a deep discontinuity between phenomenal and intentional states, such that they refrain from attributing feelings and experiences to entities that do not have the right kind of body, though they may attribute thoughts to entities that lack a biological body, like corporations, robots, and disembodied souls. We examine some of the research that has been used to motivate the discontinuity view. Specifically, we focus on experiments that examine…
31 Citations
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Does the S & M Robot Feel Guilty ?
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Mark Phelan Lawrence University
Abstract:
Philosophers
of
mind
typically
group
experiential
states
together
and
distinguish
these
from
intentional
states
on
the
basis
of
their
…
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