Thinking is Believing

@article{Mandelbaum2014ThinkingIB,
  title={Thinking is Believing},
  author={Eric Mandelbaum},
  journal={Inquiry},
  year={2014},
  volume={57},
  pages={55 - 96}
}
Abstract The idea that people can entertain propositions without believing them is widespread, intuitive, and most probably false. The main goal of this essay is to argue against the claim that people can entertain a proposition without believing it. Evidence is presented demonstrating that we cannot withhold assent from any proposition we happen to consider. A model of belief fixation is then sketched and used to explain hitherto disparate, recalcitrant and somewhat mysterious psychological… 
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