Thinking about Consciousness

  title={Thinking about Consciousness},
  author={David Papineau},
Preface Introduction 1. The Case for Materialism 2. Conceptual Dualism 3. The Impossibility of Zombies 4. Phenomenal Concepts 5. The Explanatory Gap 6. The Intuition of Distinctness 7. Prospects for the Scientific Study of Phenomenal Consciousness Appendix: The History of the Completeness of Physics 

Relationalism and the problems of consciousness

Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that

What explains the “hard” problem of consciousness?

Graziano and colleagues (this volume) have proposed a new theory of consciousness, called Attention Schema Theory (AST), both in an attempt to dissolve the “hard” problem of consciousness and as a supplement to current theories of consciousness.

Experience, intentionality, and concepts: essays in the philosophy of perception

  • A. Nes
  • Philosophy, Psychology
  • 2008
Some conceptualists are committed to the idea that subjects have recognitional capacities for the specific features they experience things as having. I argue that subjects do not have such

An Introduction to Metaphilosophy

1. Introduction: what good is metaphilosophy? 2. What is philosophy? 3. Philosophy, science and the humanities 4. The data of philosophy 5. Analytic and continental philosophy 6. Philosophy and the

Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences

Context: Contemporary philosophy of consciousness has not yet come up with an acceptable theory of consciousness. Philosophers are still not able to reach agreement, and have come to a deadlock, …

Physicalism , dualism , and metaphysical gridlock 1

Consciousness is frustratingly resistant to our efforts to understand it – especially where its relation to the physical world is concerned. During the last four decades, there has been a resurgence

A Deweyan Assessment of Three Major Tendencies in Philosophy of Consciousness

Abstract:I suggest that John Dewey's approach to the problem of consciousness is both methodologically and metaphysically superior to those found in contemporary debates. Dewey advances a picture of

On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought

Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is th

Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?

  • F. Kammerer
  • Philosophy
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology
  • 2018
Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do

Self-representationalism and the Russellian ignorance hypothesis: a hybrid response to the problem of consciousness

This thesis aims to provide a compelling and distinctive response to the Problem of Consciousness. This is achieved by offering a bipartite analysis of the epistemic gap at the heart of that problem,