Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness

  title={Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness},
  author={Johannes Roessler},
  journal={Review of Philosophy and Psychology},
  • J. Roessler
  • Published 1 September 2016
  • Philosophy
  • Review of Philosophy and Psychology
This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different… 
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