Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography.

@article{Lydersen2010ThermalBO,
  title={Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography.},
  author={Lars Lydersen and Carlos Wiechers and Christoffer Wittmann and Dominique Elser and Johannes Skaar and Vadim Makarov},
  journal={Optics express},
  year={2010},
  volume={18 26},
  pages={
          27938-54
        }
}
It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010)]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors under bright… 

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