Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography.

@article{Lydersen2010ThermalBO,
  title={Thermal blinding of gated detectors in quantum cryptography.},
  author={Lars Lydersen and Carlos Wiechers and Christoffer Wittmann and Dominique Elser and Johannes Skaar and Vadim Makarov},
  journal={Optics express},
  year={2010},
  volume={18 26},
  pages={
          27938-54
        }
}
It has previously been shown that the gated detectors of two commercially available quantum key distribution (QKD) systems are blindable and controllable by an eavesdropper using continuous-wave illumination and short bright trigger pulses, manipulating voltages in the circuit [Nat. Photonics 4, 686 (2010)]. This allows for an attack eavesdropping the full raw and secret key without increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER). Here we show how thermal effects in detectors under bright… Expand
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