There is No Paradox of Logical Validity

  title={There is No Paradox of Logical Validity},
  author={Roy T. Cook},
  journal={Logica Universalis},
  • R. Cook
  • Published 2014
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • Logica Universalis
A number of authors (including Field in Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008; Shapiro in Philos Q 61:320–342, 2010; Whittle in Analysis 64:318–326, 2004; Beall and Murzi in J Philos 110:143–165, 2013) have argued that Peano Arithmetic (PA) supplemented with a logical validity predicate is inconsistent in much the same manner as is PA supplemented with an unrestricted truth predicate. In this paper I show that, on the contrary, there is no genuine paradox of logical… Expand
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