• DOI:10.1037/1076-8971.11.2.295
• Corpus ID: 16387950

There are no public-policy implications: A reply to Rushton and Jensen (2005).

@article{Sternberg2005ThereAN,
  title={There are no public-policy implications: A reply to Rushton and Jensen (2005).},
  author={Robert J. Sternberg},
  journal={Psychology, Public Policy and Law},
  year={2005},
  volume={11},
  pages={295-301}
}

• R. Sternberg
• Published 1 June 2005
• Education
• Psychology, Public Policy and Law

J. P. Rushton and A. R. Jensen (2005) purport to show public-policy implications arising from their analysis of alleged genetic bases for group mean differences in IQ. This article argues that none of these implications in fact follow from any of the data they present. The risk in work such as this is that public-policy implications may come to be ideologically driven rather than data driven, and to drive the research rather than be driven by the data. The quest to show that one socially defined racial, ethnic, or other group is inferior to another in some important way, such that “the public must accept the pragmatic reality that some groups will be overrepresented and other groups underrepresented in various socially valued outcomes” (Rushton & Jensen, 2005, p. 283), has what I believe to be a long, sad history. Since ancient times, cynical political, religious, and other leaders have used such arguments to justify discriminatory ideological positions. Does science want to provide them the ammunition? Scientists might argue that their work is value free and that they are not responsible for the repugnant or even questionable values or actions of opportunistic leaders. Rushton and Jensen (2005) seem to believe, as have others, that they do perform a kind of value-free science and that they merely respect the truth. However, using tests and scoring them in itself represents a value judgment: Taking a test means different things for diverse groups, and the backgrounds of varied groups who take these tests are different (Greenfield, 1997). Studying so-called races represents a value judgment because race is a social construction, not a biological concept, and Rushton and Jensen’s entire article is based on the false premise of race as having meaning other than in their and other people’s imaginations (Sternberg, Grigorenko, & Kidd, 2005). Deciding to study group differences represents a value judgment—that the problem is worth studying. Deciding to show that one group is genetically inferior on an index is a value judgment as to what is worth showing. These decisions, among others, indicate that there is no value-free science. Few of us can hear our own accents when we speak—only other people have accents! In the same way, supposedly “value-free science” reflects the values of investigators who cannot see their own values underlying their research.