There's No Time like the Present (In Minkowski Spacetime)

  title={There's No Time like the Present (In Minkowski Spacetime)},
  author={Steven F. Savitt},
  journal={Philosophy of Science},
  pages={S563 - S574}
Mark Hinchliff concludes a recent paper, "The Puzzle of Change," with a section entitled "Is the Presentist Refuted by the Special Theory of Relativity?" His answer is "no." I respond by arguing that presentists face great difficulties in merely stating their position in Minkowski spacetime. I round up some likely candidates for the job and exhibit their deficiencies. 

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