Theory of mind in nonhuman primates

  title={Theory of mind in nonhuman primates},
  author={Cecilia Heyes},
  journal={Behavioral and Brain Sciences},
  pages={101 - 114}
  • C. Heyes
  • Published 1 February 1998
  • Psychology, Biology
  • Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Since the BBS article in which Premack and Woodruff (1978) asked “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?,” it has been repeatedly claimed that there is observational and experimental evidence that apes have mental state concepts, such as “want” and “know.” Unlike research on the development of theory of mind in childhood, however, no substantial progress has been made through this work with nonhuman primates. A survey of empirical studies of imitation, self-recognition, social relationships… 

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  • G. G. Gallup
  • Psychology, Biology
    American journal of primatology
  • 1982
An attempt is made to show that self‐awareness, consciousness, and mind are not mutually exclusive cognitive categories and that the emergence of self-awareness may be equivalent to the emergenceof mind.

CHAPTER 15 – Do Apes Ape?

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