Theory of mind

@article{Frith2005TheoryOM,
  title={Theory of mind},
  author={Chris D. Frith and Uta Frith},
  journal={Current Biology},
  year={2005},
  volume={15},
  pages={R644-R645}
}
Putting the pieces together: The development of theory of mind and (mental) language
A particular milk carton contains a coin. Show someone else the carton and ask them what’s in it. What will they say? Milk! But this is not so obvious for young children. Appreciating other people’s
Where is the ‘Theory’ in Theory of Mind?
Why did ‘Theory of Mind’ take off when it did, and what, if anything, holds this very diverse approach together? The focus of research within developmental psychology since the 1960s had been the
How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition
TLDR
Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated, and the “mindreading is prior” model is developed, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual mental events while claiming that metacognitive access to the authors' own attitudes always results from swift unconscious self-interpretation.
Basic social cognition without mindreading: minding minds without attributing contents
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It is argued that mind-reading hypotheses (MRHs), of any kind, are not needed to best describe or best explain basic acts of social cognition, and a new competitor for MRHs is revealed: mind minding hypothesis (MMHs).
Conflict and Habit: A Social Cognitive Neuroscience Approach to the Self
EISENBERGER " But that's how biographies are. I mean, who's going to read about the peaceful life and times of a nobody employed at the Kawasaki Municipal Library " —Haruki Murakami (1994), Dance,
Against a normative view of folk psychology
TLDR
It is proposed that moving away from a normative agenda in FP and embracing a more descriptivist framework proves extremely useful for their understanding of how the authors understand others' minds.
Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It’s Not What You Do but What You Know
TLDR
The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments the authors endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.
The developmental origins of naïve psychology in infancy.
The pretense debate
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