• DOI:10.55540/0031-1723.2419
• Corpus ID: 10033548

Theory of Victory

@article{Bartholomees2008TheoryOV,
  title={Theory of Victory},
  author={J. Boone Bartholomees},
  journal={The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters},
  year={2008}
}

• J. B. Bartholomees
• Published 1 May 2008
• Economics
• The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters

The United States is developing a reputation much like Germany had in the twentieth century of being tactically and operationally superb but strategically inept. Often stated as a tendency to win the war but lose the peace, this problem has a huge theoretical component that the national security community has only recently begun to address. In fact, the concept of victory is the biggest theoretical challenge facing security professionals today. The security profession needs a basic theoretical construct within which to think about winning wars. Gallons of ink have been expended over the centuries on how to win wars, but that effort has largely been uninformed by even a rudimentary theory of victory. Many existing theories pay little attention to what victory is and why one wins, going instead to the more difficult issue of how one wins. When theorists do address winning, it is usually in passing, as an assumption, or as an excursion from their primary topic. Clausewitz is an exception to this assertion, but his musings on winning are scattered and incomplete. There is a school of thought that claims theory is not necessary for competent performance. (1) While that might explain how mankind has gone without a theory of victory for so long, it does not negate the utility of theory. Existing theories of war are not necessarily wrong; they simply might benefit from some supplemental thought specifically devoted to victory. Fortunately, the extant theoretical literature contains enough material to begin constructing a theory of victory. (2) The author is not alone in believing a theory of victory is needed. Colin S. Gray wrote a monograph on the possibility of decisive victory that addresses the concept of winning, although his primary focus is on the concept of decisiveness. (3) William Martel published a book on the theory of victory in 2007. (4) Martel acknowledges his is not a complete theory of victory, but he offers an excellent start. This article is not a comprehensive theory of victory either, but is presented in an attempt to continue the discussion. What is Winning and Victory? Victory in war is at the most basic level an assessment, not a fact or condition. It is someone's opinion or an amalgamation of opinions. Victory in war may or may not have anything to do with objective criteria such as casualties or territory taken or lost. In winning a war, those things matter--at least at some level and always in terms of their effect on perception--but what matters most is the ultimate perception of the situation, not the facts. Different people, depending on their perspective, can legitimately differ in their assessment. The assessment aspect complicates the issue of winning exponentially since it introduces the uncontrolled variables of whose assessment takes precedence, for how much, and based on what criteria. Several points flow from this assertion. Results from any direct interaction of two bodies will be closely related and interdependent. This is especially true when there is a contest between them, but because winning is an assessment and not a proven conclusion, the results of wars are independent for each side and may vary by participant. That is, the fact that one side won big does not necessarily mean its opponent lost big. It may not even mean that the other side lost at all. Second, winning a war (as opposed to a battle or campaign) is a political condition. If war is a political act, victory at the highest levels is correspondingly defined in political terms. The implication is that tactical or operational victory without favorable political outcomes is sterile, and by any reasonable assessment that is true. But knowing that strategic victory is a political condition is not a sufficient understanding of victory. Next, because it is a perception or assessment, victory is heavily dependent on perspective. In a military sense, this translates into being sensitive to the level of war. …