Theory and Decision On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency

  • Gustavo Bergantiñosy, Jordi Massóz, Alejandro Nemex
  • Published 2016

Abstract

We consider a society whose members have to choose not only an outcome from a given set of outcomes but also the subset of agents that will remain members of the society. We study the extensions of approval voting, plurality voting, scoring methods and the Condorcet winner to our setting from the point of view of their internal stability and consistency properties. Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency Gustavo Bergantiñosy, Jordi Massóz and Alejandro Nemex

Cite this paper

@inproceedings{Bergantiosy2016TheoryAD, title={Theory and Decision On Societies Choosing Social Outcomes, and their Memberships: Internal Stability and Consistency}, author={Gustavo Berganti{\~n}osy and Jordi Mass{\'o}z and Alejandro Nemex}, year={2016} }