Theories of the Firm

  title={Theories of the Firm},
  author={Jackie Krafft and Jacques-Laurent Ravix},
Recent works on the theory of the firm have demonstrated how difficult it is to fully grasp and qualify this subject (L. Putterman, 1986; G.C. Archibald, 1987; B.R. Holsmtrom-J. Tirole, 1989). It is presented as a juxtaposition of different subjects since “obviously, no single model or theory will capture all elements of the puzzle” (B.R. Holmstrom — J. Tirole, 1989, p. 65). The suggested subjects are supposed to integrate the empirical aspects lacking in the abstract notion of the firm… Expand
The Theory of the Firm: An Overview of the Economic Mainstream, Revised Edition
In this survey we give a short overview of the way in which the theory of the firm has been formulated within the 'mainstream' of economics, both 'past' and 'present'. As to a break point between theExpand
The Theory of Business Transaction and the Boundaries of the Firm
When Ronald Coase wrote his seminal article on the nature of the firm, it set off a new field of economics – the neo institutional economics and lately called transaction cost economics. With itsExpand
The Firm and the Authority Relation: Hierarchy vs. Organization
Research in the modern theory of economic organization predominantly addresses issues relating to one or a combination of three fundamental questions originally posed or implied by Ronald CoaseExpand
Economics and Finance of the Firm as an Entity
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Strategy research in the German context: The influence of economic, sociological and philosophical traditions
The present paper takes a look at the particularities of German strategy research over the last three decades. In contrast to much of the Anglo-Saxon research, which has focused on competition as aExpand
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From Labor Process Theory to Critical Management Studies
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Is the Most Unproductive Firm the Foundation of the Most Efficient Economy? Penrosian Learning Confronts the Neoclassical Fallacy
Edith Penrose’s 1959 book The Theory of the Growth of the Firm [TGF] provides intellectual foundations for a theory of innovative enterprise, which is essential to any attempt to explain productivityExpand
Innovative Enterprise or Sweatshop Economics?: In Search of Foundations of Economic Analysis
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The Theory of the Firm Revisited
From the birth of modern economics in 1776 to 1970, a span of almost 200 years, only two works seem to have been written about the theory of the firm that have altered the perspectives of theExpand
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
This paper attempts to explain how the separation of security ownership and control, typical of large corporations, can be an efficient form of economic organization. We first set aside theExpand
The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
This monumental work on the corporation is one of those enduring classics that many cite but few have read. Graced with a new introduction by Weidenbaum and Jensen, this new edition makes thisExpand
In this paper we draw on recent progress in the theory of (1) property rights, (2) agency, and (3) finance to develop a theory of ownership structure for the firm.1 In addition to tying togetherExpand
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations
THE new institutional economics is preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs. Indeed, if transaction costs are negligible, the organization of economic activityExpand
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This book is a guide through the historical, legal and institutional background of corporate governance debates. It explains the three broad views on the relationship among the governance,Expand
BAD FOR PRACTICE: A Critique of the Transaction Cost Theory.
Organizations are not mere substitutes for structuring efficient transactions when markets fail; they possess unique advantages for governing certain kinds of economic activities through a logic th...