Theories of coalitional rationality

@article{Ambrus2009TheoriesOC,
  title={Theories of coalitional rationality},
  author={Attila Ambrus},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2009},
  volume={144},
  pages={676-695}
}
This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal form games. The best response of a coalition is defined to be a correspondence from sets of conjectures to sets of strategies. From every best response correspondence it is possible to obtain a definition of the event that a coalition is rational. It requires that if it is common certainty among players in the coalition that play is in some… CONTINUE READING

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