Theories of Distributive Justice

@inproceedings{Roemer1996TheoriesOD,
  title={Theories of Distributive Justice},
  author={John E. Roemer},
  year={1996}
}
Acknowledgments Introduction The Measurement of Utility and Arrow's Theorem The Measurability and Comparability of Utility The Arrow Impossibility Theorem Reformulation of the Impossibility Theorem with Utility Functions The Connection between Arrovian Social Choice and Distributive Justice Social Choice on Economic Environments Conclusion Axiomatic Bargaining Theory Justice as Rational Prudence The Nash Bargaining Solution Other Axiomatizations of the Nash Solution The Kalai-Smorodinsky and… 
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