Theological determinism and the problem of evil

@article{Judisch2008TheologicalDA,
  title={Theological determinism and the problem of evil},
  author={Neal Judisch},
  journal={Religious Studies},
  year={2008},
  volume={44},
  pages={165 - 184}
}
Abstract I argue that the free-will defence need not presuppose a libertarian conception of freedom and therefore need not beg the question against compatibilists. I present three versions of theological determinism, each of which is inconsistent with freedom on compatibilist-friendly principles, and then argue that what generates the inconsistency – viz, that (1) God intentionally necessitates all human actions, and (2) no human has it within her power to influence causally God's will – is… Expand
3 Citations
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