The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium

@article{Shinotsuka2003TheWC,
  title={The weak core of simple games with ordinal preferences: implementation in Nash equilibrium},
  author={Tomoichi Shinotsuka and Koji Takamiya},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2003},
  volume={44},
  pages={379-389}
}
In a simple game, coalitions belonging to a given class are "absolutely powerful" while others have no power. We attempt to make this distinction operational. Toward this end, we propose two axioms on social choice correspondences, Strong Non-Discrimination and Exclusion. Strong Non-Discrimination describes circumstances under which certain coalitions, the losing coalitions, have no influence over social choice. Exclusion requires that there are situations in which certain coalitions, the… CONTINUE READING

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