The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources

  title={The value-added of laboratory experiments for the study of institutions and common-pool resources},
  author={E. Ostrom},
  journal={Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization},
  • E. Ostrom
  • Published 2006
  • Economics
  • Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
  • Abstract This article provides an overview of the effects of communication on experimental studies of behavior and outcomes in common-pool resource (CPR) dilemmas. Aggregate outcomes in CPR dilemmas without communication approximate predictions of non-cooperative game theory, but allowing cheap talk results in higher outcomes. When exogenous rules are monitored at realistic levels, subjects cheat even though following the rule would generate optimal outcomes. If given the opportunity… CONTINUE READING
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