The ussr and total war: why didn't the soviet economy collapse in 1942?

  title={The ussr and total war: why didn't the soviet economy collapse in 1942?},
  author={Mark Harrison},
  • M. Harrison
  • Published 25 April 2001
  • History, Economics, Political Science
Germany’s campaign in Russia was intended to be the decisive factor in creating a new German empire in central and eastern Europe, a living space that could be restructured racially and economically in German interests as Hitler had defined them in Mein Kampf. When he launched his armies against the Soviet Union in 1941 the world had two good reasons to expect him to achieve a quick victory. One, for those with long memories, was the Russian economic performance in 1914–17: when faced with a… 

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