The tragedy of the commons and prisoner's dilemma may improve our realization of the theory of life and provide us with advanced therapeutic ways

  title={The tragedy of the commons and prisoner's dilemma may improve our realization of the theory of life and provide us with advanced therapeutic ways},
  author={Ahmed Ibrahim},
Maintenance of cooperative traits is a critical question in evolutionary theory, especially when the social dilemma, generated by the interface between cooperators and cheaters, is invoked. Since the 1960s, a large body of literature has focused on this topic and suggested various solutions. However, despite the great effort of evolutionary biologists, the arguments advanced are only partial and never seem to offer a conclusive answer. Nevertheless, it seems that the only generalizable solution… 
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Game theoretic consideration of transgenic bacteria in the human gut microbiota as a pro-biotic prophylactic for metabolic syndrome

The game theoretic treatment provides the basis of a model mechanism for prophylactic nutritional therapy for metabolic syndrome by the transgenic bacteria, providing support of indigenous gut microbiota and additional supplementation of a pro-biotic.



Altruism and Related Phenomena, Mainly in Social Insects

With better knowledge of heredity and with more facts regarding the social insects to draw upon, Weismann recognized the possible conflict between intergroup and intragroup selection in the evolution of worker attributes.

The evolution of cooperation and altruism: the basic conditions are simple and well known

The review by Lehman & Keller (2006) investigates the conditions under which natural selection can cause individuals of the same species to help each other and suggests that the only fundamental new evolutionary principle behind the evolution of cooperation and altruism is that of Hamilton (1964).

Resolving the tragedy of the commons: the feedback between intraspecific conflict and population density

  • D. Rankin
  • Economics
    Journal of evolutionary biology
  • 2007
A model of the evolutionary tragedy of the commons that explicitly considers the population dynamics where individuals invest in individually costly competitive traits shows that a feedback between the investment in competition and population density can act to reduce the level of conflict and prevent the population from going extinct.

The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I.

The evolution of cooperation.

A model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game to show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established.

Prisoner's dilemma in an RNA virus

It is shown that the fitness of the high-multiplicity phage relative to their ancestors generates a pay-off matrix conforming to the prisoner's dilemma strategy of game theory, in which defection (selfishness) evolves, despite the greater fitness pay-offs that would result if all players were to cooperate.

The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism

  • R. Trivers
  • Psychology
    The Quarterly Review of Biology
  • 1971
A model is presented to account for the natural selection of what is termed reciprocally altruistic behavior. The model shows how selection can operate against the cheater (non-reciprocator) in the

Spatial structure often inhibits the evolution of cooperation in the snowdrift game

The results caution against the common belief that spatial structure is necessarily beneficial for cooperative behaviour, and show that no such general predictions can be made for the effects of spatial structure in the snowdrift game.

Demography and the tragedy of the commons

  • S. Frank
  • Biology
    Journal of evolutionary biology
  • 2010
It is concluded that analyses of sociality must account for both the behavioural associations of kin selection theory and the demographic consequences of life history theory in order to overcome the tragedy of the commons and enhance the integration of group behaviour.

Evolution and the Theory of Games

It is beginning to become clear that a range of problems in evolution theory can most appropriately be attacked by a modification of the theory of games, a branch of mathematics first formulated by Von Neumann and Morgenstern in 1944 for the analysis of human conflicts.