The structure of strategy-proof social choice - Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces

@article{Nehring2007TheSO,
  title={The structure of strategy-proof social choice - Part I: General characterization and possibility results on median spaces},
  author={K. Nehring and C. Puppe},
  journal={J. Econ. Theory},
  year={2007},
  volume={135},
  pages={269-305}
}
Abstract We define a general notion of single-peaked preferences based on abstract betweenness relations. Special cases are the classical example of single-peaked preferences on a line, the separable preferences on the hypercube, the “multi-dimensionally single-peaked” preferences on the product of lines, but also the unrestricted preference domain. Generalizing and unifying the existing literature, we show that a social choice function is strategy-proof on a sufficiently rich domain of… Expand
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