The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?

  title={The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing?},
  author={Chris N. H. Street and Jaume Masip},
  journal={Scandinavian journal of psychology},
  volume={56 3},
People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are; this is called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic-analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the… 

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