The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation

  title={The self-organizing impact of averaged payoffs on the evolution of cooperation},
  author={Attila Szolnoki and Matja{\vz} Perc},
  journal={New Journal of Physics},
According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This… 

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