The sample complexity of auctions with side information

@article{Devanur2016TheSC,
  title={The sample complexity of auctions with side information},
  author={Nikhil R. Devanur and Zhiyi Huang and Alexandros Psomas},
  journal={Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing},
  year={2016}
}
Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a continuum. For example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their annual income, their propensity to buy an item based on… Expand
84 Citations
The sample complexity of revenue maximization
  • 186
  • PDF
On the Competition Complexity of Dynamic Mechanism Design
  • 19
  • PDF
Learning in repeated auctions
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
The Query Complexity of Bayesian Auctions
  • 1
  • Highly Influenced
  • PDF
Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees
  • 5
  • PDF
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization
  • 29
  • PDF
Incentive-Compatible Learning of Reserve Prices for Repeated Auctions
  • 4
  • PDF
Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples
  • Yang Cai, C. Daskalakis
  • Mathematics, Computer Science
  • 2017 IEEE 58th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)
  • 2017
  • 40
  • PDF
...
1
2
3
4
5
...

References

SHOWING 1-6 OF 6 REFERENCES
The sample complexity of revenue maximization
  • 186
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
Prior-free auctions with ordered bidders
  • 10
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
Revenue maximization with a single sample
  • 189
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing
  • 8
  • Highly Influential
  • PDF
The Sample Complexity of Auctions with Side Information
  • ArXiv e-prints,
  • 2015
Auction versus negotiations
  • American Economic Review,
  • 1996