• Corpus ID: 208267951

The route to chaos in routing games: When is price of anarchy too optimistic?

@article{Chotibut2019TheRT,
  title={The route to chaos in routing games: When is price of anarchy too optimistic?},
  author={Thiparat Chotibut and Fryderyk Falniowski and Michał Misiurewicz and Georgios Piliouras},
  journal={arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory},
  year={2019}
}
Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test for these classic results by studying the ubiquitous dynamics, Multiplicative Weights Update, in different classes of congestion games, uncovering intricate non-equilibrium phenomena. As the system demand increases, the learning dynamics go through period… 

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