The role of learning data in causal reasoning about observations and interventions

  title={The role of learning data in causal reasoning about observations and interventions},
  author={Bj{\"o}orn Meder and York Hagmayer and Michael R. Waldmann},
  journal={Memory \& Cognition},
Recent studies have shown that people have the capacity to derive interventional predictions for previously unseen actions from observational knowledge, a finding that challenges associative theories of causal learning and reasoning (e.g., Meder, Hagmayer, & Waldmann, 2008). Although some researchers have claimed that such inferences are based mainly on qualitative reasoning about the structure of a causal system (e.g., Sloman, 2005), we propose that people use both the causal structure and its… 

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Learning, prediction and causal Bayes nets

  • C. Glymour
  • Psychology
    Trends in Cognitive Sciences
  • 2003