The right to die in the minimally conscious state

@article{Johnson2010TheRT,
  title={The right to die in the minimally conscious state},
  author={L Syd M Johnson},
  journal={Journal of Medical Ethics},
  year={2010},
  volume={37},
  pages={175 - 178}
}
  • L. Johnson
  • Published 17 November 2010
  • Medicine
  • Journal of Medical Ethics
The right to die has for decades been recognised for persons in a vegetative state, but there remains controversy about ending life-sustaining medical treatment for persons in the minimally conscious state (MCS). The controversy is rooted in assumptions about the moral significance of consciousness, and the value of life for patients who are conscious and not terminally ill. This paper evaluates these assumptions in light of evidence that generates concerns about quality of life in the MCS. It… 

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