The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector

@article{Brezis2019TheRD,
  title={The revolving door, state connections, and inequality of influence in the financial sector},
  author={Elise S. Brezis and Jo{\"e}l Cariolle},
  journal={Journal of Institutional Economics},
  year={2019},
  volume={15},
  pages={595 - 614}
}
Abstract This paper shows that the revolving door generates inequality of influence between financial firms and creates economic distortions. We first develop a theoretical model, introducing the notion of “bureaucratic capital” and stressing how the revolving door generates inequality in bureaucratic capital leading to inequality in profits. Then this prediction is tested, using a new database that tracks the revolving door process involving the 20 biggest US “diversified banks.” We show that… 
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