The red herring and the pet fish: why concepts still can't be prototypes

@article{Fodor1996TheRH,
  title={The red herring and the pet fish: why concepts still can't be prototypes},
  author={Jerry A. Fodor and Ernie Lepore},
  journal={Cognition},
  year={1996},
  volume={58},
  pages={253-270}
}

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