The recognition of mentalistic agents in infancy

@article{Johnson2000TheRO,
  title={The recognition of mentalistic agents in infancy},
  author={Susan C. Johnson},
  journal={Trends in Cognitive Sciences},
  year={2000},
  volume={4},
  pages={22-28}
}
The ability to construe ourselves and others as agents with minds having mental states such as perceptions, attention, desires and beliefs, is critical to humans' social, linguistic, and cognitive competence. When and how this ability becomes available to us during development is therefore of particular theoretical importance. Historically, most work in this area has concentrated on the ability of three- and four-year-olds to predict and explain behaviors based on false beliefs. With recent… Expand
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