The rationality of informal argumentation: a Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.

  title={The rationality of informal argumentation: a Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.},
  author={Ulrike Hahn and Mike Oaksford},
  journal={Psychological review},
  volume={114 3},
Classical informal reasoning "fallacies," for example, begging the question or arguing from ignorance, while ubiquitous in everyday argumentation, have been subject to little systematic investigation in cognitive psychology. In this article it is argued that these "fallacies" provide a rich taxonomy of argument forms that can be differentially strong, dependent on their content. A Bayesian theory of content-dependent argument strength is presented. Possible psychological mechanisms are… 
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