The public choice theory of murray N. Rothbard, a modern anarchist

@article{Frech1973ThePC,
  title={The public choice theory of murray N. Rothbard, a modern anarchist},
  author={H. E. Iii Frech},
  journal={Public Choice},
  year={1973},
  volume={14},
  pages={143-154}
}
  • H. Frech
  • Published 1 March 1973
  • Political Science
  • Public Choice
Summary and ConclusionsThe case against the State presented by Rothbard is very disquieting. His frustrating misunderstanding of the problems of monopoly and externalities weakens the argument, but one can easily reformulate it in a more elegant way: The costs of State action are so great that they outweigh any possible improvement of efficiency from reducing monpoly or internalizing externalities.Clearly the mass murders and wars and enslavements which have been carried out throughout history… 
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