The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games

@article{Lahkar2008ThePD,
  title={The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games},
  author={Ratul Lahkar and William H. Sandholm},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
  year={2008},
  volume={64},
  pages={565-590}
}
The projection dynamic is an evolutionary dynamic for population games. It is derived from a model of individual choice in which agents abandon their current strategies at rates inversely proportional to the strategies’ current levels of use. The dynamic admits a simple geometric definition, its rest points coincide with the Nash equilibria of the underlying game, and it converges globally to Nash equilibrium in potential games and in stable games. JEL classification: C72, C73. 
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