The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems

  title={The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems},
  author={Donald G. Saari and Jill Van Newenhizen},
  journal={Public Choice},
It is well known that a plurality election need not reflect the true sentiments of the electorate. Some of the proposed reform procedures, such as approval and cumulative voting, share the characteristics that there are several ways to tally each voter's preferences. Voting systems that permit truncated ballots share this feature. It is shown that the election results for any such procedure can be highly indeterminate; all possible election results can occur with the same choice of sincere… 
The condorcet-efficiency of sophisticated voting under the plurality and approval procedures
Investigation of the frequency with which a Condorcet winner is elected under the plurality and approval procedures when voters are assumed to act sophisticatedly finds sophisticated voting under the approval procedure seems to be moreCondorcet-efficient than the sincere version of this procedure.
The Problem of the Divided Majority: Preference Aggregation Under Uncertainty
This paper assess and compare the performance of three voting mechanisms, Approval Voting, Borda Count, and Plurality Voting under two information structures, to study the extent to which voting methods defeat the Condorcet loser and elect thecondorcet winner in a repeated-game, divided majority setting.
Voter Sovereignty and Election Outcomes
Voters are sovereign to the degree that they can express their approval for any set of candidates. While voter sovereignty is maximized under approval voting (AV), AV can lead to a plethora of
A Strategic Problem in Approval Voting
Problems of multi-candidate races in U.S. presidential elections—exemplified by Ralph Nader’s spoiler effect in 2000—motivated the modern invention and advocacy of approval voting; but it has not
Approval Voting, Borda Winners, and Condorcet Winners: Evidence From Seven Elections
We analyze 10 three-candidate elections (and mock elections) conducted under approval voting (AV) using a method developed by Falmagne and Regenwetter (1996) that allows us to construct a
President Perot or Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election
Different voting systems can lead to different election outcomeseven when voter preferences are held constant. Using the 1992 election as anexample, it is shown how the outcome of every positional
Voting Systems that Combine Approval and Preference
This work proposes a way of combining PAV and FV in two hybrid voting systems, preference approval voting (PAV) and fallback voting (FV), that satisfy several desirable properties, including monotonicity.
Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting
Approval voting (AV) has been defended and criticized from many different viewpoints. In this paper, I will concentrate on two topics: preference intensities and strategic behavior. A voter is
Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections
Approval Voting is a voting procedure in which a voter can vote for as many candidates as she wishes, and the candidate who receives the most votes wins the election. Since the seminal contribution


The Problem of Strategic Behavior under Approval Voting
  • R. Niemi
  • Economics
    American Political Science Review
  • 1984
Approval voting is being promoted as “the election reform of the 20th century” (Brams, 1980, p. 105), and indeed if voters' preferences are dichotomous, approval voting has some remarkable qualities:
Manipulability of voting by sincere truncation of preferences
A weak form of strategic voting, called ‘sincere truncation,’ occurs when a voter with a strict preference ranking does not rank all his or her choices on the ballot. A voting procedure is said to be
A Debut for Approval Voting
  • J. Nagel
  • Economics
    PS: Political Science & Politics
  • 1984
Approval voting-an electoral reform that allows voters to vote for as many candidates as they choose to support-has been the object of intensive analysis by political scientists and mathematicians
Inconsistencies of Weighted Summation Voting Systems
  • D. Saari
  • Economics, Mathematics
    Math. Oper. Res.
  • 1982
It is shown for a voting system coming from a large class of weighted summation voting systems that there exist examples of voter profiles such that if the voters vote on N alternatives the aggregated result is (alpha) N -1, but if they vote on ( N - 1) alternatives, the aggregate result is(alpha)N -1.
The Optimal Ranking Method is the Borda Count
This is a comprehensive investigation of the Borda count method, which is shown to come out fairly well when compared with other ranking methods. This research was carried out in collaboration
Susceptibility to manipulation
All positional voting procedures can be manipulated, so it is natural to question whether some of these systems are more susceptible to being manipulated than others. In this essay, this
America's Unfair Elections