The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments

  title={The probabilistic serial mechanism with private endowments},
  author={{\"O}zg{\"u}r Yilmaz},
  journal={Games and Economic Behavior},
A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. When there are no private endowments, the set of ordinally efficient random assignments is characterized by the eating algorithm (Bogomolnaia and Moulin 2001). However, when there are private endowments, the main requirement is individual rationality and and the eating algorithm fails to deliver this property. Our contribution is the natural generalization… CONTINUE READING
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