The pro-life argument from substantial identity: a defence.

@article{Lee2004ThePA,
  title={The pro-life argument from substantial identity: a defence.},
  author={Patrick E. Lee},
  journal={Bioethics},
  year={2004},
  volume={18 3},
  pages={
          249-63
        }
}
This article defends the following argument: what makes you and I valuable so that it is wrong to kill us now is what we are (essentially). But we are essentially physical organisms, who, embryology reveals, came to be at conception/fertilisation. I reply to the objection to this argument (as found in Dean Stretton, Judith Thomson, and Jeffrey Reiman), which holds that we came to be at one time, but became valuable as a subject of rights only some time later, in virtue of an acquired… Expand

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PRO-LIFE ARGUMENT FROM SUBSTANTIAL IDENTITY
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