The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals requires no restrictions

  title={The principle of the indiscernibility of identicals requires no restrictions},
  author={Ari Maunu},
There is a certain argument against the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals (PInI), or the thesis that whatever is true of a thing is true of anything identical with that thing. In this argument, PInI is used together with the self-evident principle of the necessity of self-identity (“necessarily, a thing is identical with itself”) to reach the conclusion , which is held to be paradoxical and, thus, fatal to PInI (in its universal, unrestricted form). My purpose is to show that the… 
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A Complete Bibliography of Publications in Synthese, 2020–2029
Abduction [336]. Abductive [11, 124]. ability [143]. Absence [188]. absences [233]. absurdity [154]. Acceptable [18]. accepting [120]. account [81, 169, 129, 13, 196, 168]. across [35]. Action [271,


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