• DOI:10.1080/13501760110120219
Corpus ID: 53073648

The politics of the European Central Bank: principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit

@article{Elgie2002ThePO,
  title={The politics of the European Central Bank: principal-agent theory and the democratic deficit},
  author={R. Elgie},
  journal={Journal of European Public Policy},
  year={2002},
  volume={9},
  pages={186 - 200}
}

• R. Elgie
• Published 2002
• Economics
• Journal of European Public Policy

The institutional design of the European Central Bank (ECB) has been the subject of considerable political debate. In particular, it has been argued that the Bank suffers from a 'democratic deficit'. This article applies the principal- agent approach to this debate so as to identify more dearly the logic that underpins the basic arguments about the democratic legitimacy of the ECB. Moreover, on the assumption that the Bank does suffer from a democratic deficit, the article also shows how… Expand

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