The phenomenal content of experience

  title={The phenomenal content of experience},
  author={Athanassios Raftopoulos and Vincent C. M{\"u}ller},
  journal={Mind \& Language},
Abstract:  We discuss in some length evidence from the cognitive science suggesting that the representations of objects based on spatiotemporal information and featural information retrieved bottom-up from a visual scene precede representations of objects that include conceptual information. We argue that a distinction can be drawn between representations with conceptual and nonconceptual content. The distinction is based on perceptual mechanisms that retrieve information in conceptually… 
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Cognitive Maps and the Language of Thought
  • Michael Rescorla
  • Psychology, Biology
    The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
  • 2009
Computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics demonstrate the possibility of rational cognitive processes in an exclusively non-logical representational medium and offer much promise for the empirical study of animal navigation.


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