The origins of private property rights: states or customary organizations?

  title={The origins of private property rights: states or customary organizations?},
  author={Ilia Murtazashvili and Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili},
  journal={Journal of Institutional Economics},
  pages={105 - 128}
Abstract Political theories of property rights are less optimistic than self-governance perspectives regarding the ability of non-state organizations to supply private property institutions. Despite offering different answers to the question of where property rights come from, these diverse perspectives share a concern with organizational capacity, constraints, and legitimacy as explanations why organizations are able to supply private property rights. We use these shared concerns as a point of… 
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