The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality

J. Dejnozka

DOI:10.1007/BF00216469

Corpus ID: 121002878

The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality

@article{Dejnozka1990TheOF,
  title={The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality},
  author={J. Dejnozka},
  journal={Erkenntnis},
  year={1990},
  volume={32},
  pages={383-418}
}

J. Dejnozka
Published 1990
Mathematics
Erkenntnis

Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe six Parmenidean theories of being Russell held, including: literal in 1903; universal in 1912; timeless… Expand

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