The motivation question

@article{Southwood2016TheMQ,
  title={The motivation question},
  author={Nicholas Southwood},
  journal={Philosophical Studies},
  year={2016},
  volume={173},
  pages={3413-3430}
}
  • N. Southwood
  • Published 5 July 2016
  • Philosophy
  • Philosophical Studies
How does it happen that our beliefs about what we ought to do cause us to intend to do what we believe we ought to do? This is what John Broome calls the “motivation question.” Broome’s answer to the motivation question is that we can bring ourselves, by our own efforts, to intend to do what we believe we ought to do by exercising a special agential capacity: the capacity to engage in what he calls “enkratic reasoning.” My aim is to evaluate this answer. In doing so, I shall focus on three core… 

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TLDR
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