The mind as a predictive modelling engine : generative models, structural similarity, and mental representation

@inproceedings{Williams2018TheMA,
  title={The mind as a predictive modelling engine : generative models, structural similarity, and mental representation},
  author={Daniel Williams},
  year={2018}
}
I outline and defend a theory of mental representation based on three ideas that I extract from the work of the mid-twentieth century philosopher, psychologist, and cybernetician Kenneth Craik: first, an account of mental representation in terms of idealised models that capitalize on structural similarity to their targets; second, an appreciation of prediction as the core function of such models; and third, a regulatory understanding of brain function. I clarify and elaborate on each of these… 

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