The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation

@inproceedings{Babaioff2017TheMC,
  title={The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation},
  author={Moshe Babaioff and Yannai A. Gonczarowski and Noam Nisan},
  booktitle={STOC},
  year={2017}
}
We consider a monopolist that is selling <i>n</i> items to a single additive buyer, where the buyer’s values for the items are drawn according to independent distributions <i>F</i><sub>1</sub>,<i>F</i><sub>2</sub>,…,<i>F</i><sub><i>n</i></sub> that possibly have unbounded support. It is well known that — unlike in the single item case — the revenue-optimal auction (a pricing scheme) may be complex, sometimes requiring a continuum of menu entries. It is also known that simple auctions… CONTINUE READING

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A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer

  • Moshe Babaio, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg.
  • Proceedings of the IEEE 55th Annual Symposium on…
  • 2014
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