The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox

  title={The lesson of Newcomb’s paradox},
  author={David H. Wolpert and Gregory Benford},
In Newcomb’s paradox you can choose to receive either the contents of a particular closed box, or the contents of both that closed box and another one. Before you choose though, an antagonist uses a prediction algorithm to accurately deduce your choice, and uses that deduction to fill the two boxes. The way they do this guarantees that you made the wrong choice. Newcomb’s paradox is that game theory’s expected utility and dominance principles appear to provide conflicting recommendations for… 
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A Complete Bibliography of Publications in Synthese, 2020–2029
Abduction [336]. Abductive [11, 124]. ability [143]. Absence [188]. absences [233]. absurdity [154]. Acceptable [18]. accepting [120]. account [81, 169, 129, 13, 196, 168]. across [35]. Action [271,


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