The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing

  title={The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing},
  author={John Joseph Horton and Lydia B. Chilton},
  journal={Labor: Human Capital eJournal},
We present a model of workers supplying labor to paid crowdsourcing projects. We also introduce a novel method for estimating a worker's reservation wage - the key parameter in our labor supply model. We tested our model by presenting experimental subjects with real-effort work scenarios that varied in the offered payment and difficulty. As predicted, subjects worked less when the pay was lower. However, they did not work less when the task was more time-consuming. Interestingly, at least some… Expand
Labor Allocation in Paid Crowdsourcing: Experimental Evidence on Positioning, Nudges and Prices
The evidence suggests that user interface and cognitive biases play an important role in online labor markets and that salience can be used by employers as a kind of "incentive multiplier". Expand
Efficient Crowdsourcing of Unknown Experts using Multi-Armed Bandits
A novel multi-armed bandit (MAB) model, the bounded MAB, is introduced that naturally captures the problem of expert crowdsourcing and an algorithm to solve it efficiently, called bounded e-first, which uses the first eB of its total budget B to derive estimates of the workers' quality characteristics (exploration), while the remaining eB is used to maximise the total utility based on those estimates (exploitation). Expand
Quality-Based Pricing for Crowdsourced Workers
The emergence of online paid crowdsourcing platforms, such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT), presents us huge opportunities to distribute tasks to human workers around the world, on-demand and atExpand
Truthful incentives in crowdsourcing tasks using regret minimization mechanisms
This paper presents a novel, no-regret posted price mechanism, BP-UCB, for budgeted procurement in stochastic online settings, and proves strong theoretical guarantees about the mechanism, and extensively evaluate it in simulations as well as on real data from the Mechanical Turk platform. Expand
Workers' Task Choice in Crowdsourcing and Human Computation Markets
This process is outlined and a structural model showing the criteria that workers use to choose tasks is proposed, based on the person-job fit theory, which includes the measures demands-abilities fit and needs-supplies fit, in order to explain the work intention. Expand
Pay It Backward: Per-Task Payments on Crowdsourcing Platforms Reduce Productivity
Paid crowdsourcing marketplaces have gained popularity by using piecework, or payment for each microtask, to incentivize workers. This norm has remained relatively unchallenged. In this paper, weExpand
Algorithmic Wage Negotiations: Applications to Paid Crowdsourcing
This paper highlights the problem that buyers and sellers encounter in arriving at prices in a distributed labor market. We argue that automated negotiation might partly remedy this problem andExpand
E ffi cient Crowdsourcing of Unknown Experts using Multi-Armed Bandits Long
We address the expert crowdsourcing problem, in which an employer wishes to assign tasks to a set of available workers with heterogeneous working costs. Critically, as workers produce results ofExpand
Matching Workers Expertise with Tasks : Incentives in Heterogeneous Crowdsourcing Markets ∗
Designing optimal pricing policies and mechanisms for allocating tasks to workers is central to the online crowdsourcing markets. In this paper, we consider the following realistic setting of onlineExpand
Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing
Crowdsourcing markets have emerged as a popular platform for matching available workers with tasks to complete. The payment for a particular task is typically set by the task’s requester, and may beExpand


Crowdsourcing and all-pay auctions
A model in which users select among, and subsequently compete in, a collection of contests offering various rewards is presented and it is found that rewards yield logarithmically diminishing returns with respect to participation levels. Expand
Financial incentives and the "performance of crowds"
It is found that increased financial incentives increase the quantity, but not the quality, of work performed by participants, where the difference appears to be due to an "anchoring" effect. Expand
Do Workers Work More If Wages are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
Most previous studies on intertemporal labor supply found very small or insignificant substitution effects. It is not clear, however, whether these results are due to institutional constraints onExpand
Labor Supply of New York City Cabdrivers: One Day at a Time
Life-cycle models of labor supply predict a positive relationship between hours supplied and transitory changes in wages. We tested this prediction using three samples of wages and hours of New YorkExpand
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market's complications, notExpand
Designing incentives for online question and answer forums
It is demonstrated that an approval-voting scoring rule and a proportional-share scoring rule can enable the most efficient equilibrium with complements information, under certain conditions, by providing incentives for early responders as well as the user who submits the final answer. Expand
Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of New York City Taxi Drivers
I develop a model of daily labor supply where preferences are dependent on a reference daily income level, and I apply this model to data on the labor supply of New York City taxi drivers. I findExpand
Crowdsourcing: Why the Power of the Crowd is Driving the Future of Business
By Jeff Howe, Published by the Crown Publishing Group, a division of Random House, Inc., 1745 Broadway, New York, NY 10019, 2008. vii + 311 p. Price $27. A new concept has emerged that is changingExpand
Get another label? improving data quality and data mining using multiple, noisy labelers
The results show clearly that when labeling is not perfect, selective acquisition of multiple labels is a strategy that data miners should have in their repertoire; for certain label-quality/cost regimes, the benefit is substantial. Expand
An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science.
Lionel Robbins’s An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science (1932) made at least three important contributions: (1) constructing a more modern, focused, and general definition ofExpand