The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing

  title={The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing},
  author={John Joseph Horton and Lydia B. Chilton},
  journal={Labor: Human Capital eJournal},
We present a model of workers supplying labor to paid crowdsourcing projects. We also introduce a novel method for estimating a worker's reservation wage - the key parameter in our labor supply model. We tested our model by presenting experimental subjects with real-effort work scenarios that varied in the offered payment and difficulty. As predicted, subjects worked less when the pay was lower. However, they did not work less when the task was more time-consuming. Interestingly, at least some… 

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