The impossibility of non-signaling privacy amplification

@article{Hnggi2013TheIO,
  title={The impossibility of non-signaling privacy amplification},
  author={Esther H{\"a}nggi and R. Renner and S. Wolf},
  journal={Theor. Comput. Sci.},
  year={2013},
  volume={486},
  pages={27-42}
}
  • Esther Hänggi, R. Renner, S. Wolf
  • Published 2013
  • Computer Science, Mathematics, Physics
  • Theor. Comput. Sci.
  • Barrett, Hardy, and Kent have shown in 2005 that protocols for quantum key agreement exist, the security of which can be proven under the assumption that quantum or relativity theory is correct. More precisely, this is based on the non-local behavior of certain quantum systems, combined with the non-signaling postulate from relativity. An advantage is that the resulting security is independent of what (quantum) systems the legitimate parties' devices operate on: they do not have to be trusted… CONTINUE READING

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