The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets

@article{Hashimoto2018TheGR,
  title={The generalized random priority mechanism with budgets},
  author={Tadashi Hashimoto},
  journal={J. Economic Theory},
  year={2018},
  volume={177},
  pages={708-733}
}
This paper studies allocation problems with and without monetary transfers, such as multi-unit auctions, school choice, and course assignment. For this class of problems, we introduce a generalized random priority mechanism with budgets (GRP). This mechanism is always ex post incentive compatible and feasible. Moreover, as the market grows large, this mechanism can approximate any incentive compatible mechanism in the corresponding continuum economy. In particular, GRP can be used to… CONTINUE READING

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