The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information

@inproceedings{Kai2005TheGS,
  title={The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information},
  author={Kai and A.. and Michael Konrad and Wolfgang Leininger},
  year={2005}
}
In the equilibrium of the all-pay auction with two groups of individual players who move sequentially, only the player with the lowest effort cost has a positive payoff. This payoff and the overall dissipation crucially depend on group composition. 
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